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THE FOG OF WAR: PROSECUTING ILLEGAL 
USES OF FORCE AS CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
MANUEL J. VENTURA∗ 
MATTHEW GILLETT∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers the possibility of the prosecution of aggression 
as a crime against humanity before the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”). First, it explores the constitutive elements of crimes against 
humanity and compares them to those of the crime of aggression. In doing 
so, it identifies a number of areas where aggression will assist in 
establishing critical elements required to sustain a conviction for crimes 
against humanity. Second, it presents a legal strategy whereby aggression 
can be adjudicated as an element of co-perpetration as a mode of liability 
when prosecuting crimes against humanity. In this manner, a factual 
finding that aggression has been committed can be made without entering 
a conviction per se for the crime. Such a finding can then be considered at 
sentencing either as an aggravating factor or as indicative of the gravity 
of the crimes and could ultimately result in the imposition of a longer 
custodial sentence. Thus, whilst the ICC may not currently possess 
jurisdiction ratione materiae over aggression, this should not limit the 
ability of ICC prosecutors to substantively invoke the crime where crimes 
against humanity are committed as a result of the illegal use of armed 
force. 
War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to 
the belligerent States alone, but affect the whole world.1  
 
 
 ∗ Manuel Ventura is an AVINA Scholar in the LL.M Programme of the Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. E-mail: manuel.j.ventura@gmail.com. 
 ∗∗ Matthew Gillett is a Trial Attorney at the Office of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). E-mail: gillettm@un.org. Both authors are 
Directors of The Peace and Justice Initiative, an NGO of international criminal law professionals that 
assists states in the national implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org). The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions to which they belong. 
 1. United States of America et al. v. Göring et al., Judgment, in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL—VOLUME 1: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
186 (International Military Tribunal 1947). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The historic agreement on a definition for the crime of aggression 
reached at Kampala, Uganda in June 2010 brought to a close a long 
codification process that had remained outstanding since the end of World 
War II. However, the compromises necessary to arrive at a consensus 
decision mean that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) will not be 
able to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until 2017 at 
the earliest.2 In light of this reality, this paper examines the conditions in 
which illegal uses of armed force can instead be prosecuted as crimes 
against humanity, particularly where those responsible for launching such 
attacks are aware that their actions will result in a large number of civilian 
deaths. 
The close relationship between armed conflict and crimes against 
humanity is hardly a new phenomenon. Indeed, at the time of the 
Nuremberg trials, crimes against humanity could not occur—as a matter of 
law3—in the absence of war.4 In modern international criminal law, such a 
 
 
 2. According to the Kampala amendments, the earliest date that the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is 2017 and must be accompanied by a decision to activate 
the ICC’s jurisdiction by states parties provided that at least one year has passed since 30 states have 
ratified the amendment: I.C.C. Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, arts. 15 bis (2)–(3), 15 ter (2)–(3) (June 11, 
2011). As of the end of February 2013, only four states—Liechtenstein, Trinidad and Tobago, Samoa, 
and Luxembourg—have done so. List of Acceptances and Ratifications to the Kampala Amendments 
to the Crime of Aggression, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= 
XVIII-10-b&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). In short, the ICC is unlikely to try an 
aggression case in the foreseeable future. 
 3. The authors note that there has been some debate in the literature as to whether this 
requirement was substantive or jurisdictional in nature. For example, the ICTY opined in Tadić that it 
was jurisdictional. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 140 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. As did Lord Millett of the House of Lords (as it 
then was) in Pinochet (No. 3). R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Ors, Ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 272 (H.L.) (per Lord Millett). On the other hand, the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Korbely v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 
9174/02, ¶ 82 (2008)) and the late Professor Cassese (Antonio Cassese, Balancing the Prosecution of 
Crimes Against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity of Criminal Law: The Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia 
Case before the ECHR, 4(2) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 410, 413 (2006)) appear to have taken the view that 
it was substantive. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia has taken the view that 
there is no consistency from the jurisprudence of the time to make a determination either way. Co-
Prosecutors v. NUON Chea et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC—E95/8, Decision on Co-
Prosecutors’ Request to Exclude Armed Conflict Nexus Requirement from the Definition of Crimes 
Against Humanity, ¶ 20 (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/court 
doc/E95_8_EN.PDF. 
 4. It was because of this ‘war nexus’ that the International Military Tribunal held that crimes 
that occurred prior to 1939 could not constitute crimes against humanity as defined at that time. United 
States of America et al. v. Göring et al., Judgment, in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra 
note 1, at 254–55. 
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war nexus is no longer necessary, having been definitively severed in the 
seminal Tadić decision5 and confirmed, inter alia, in Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC.6 Although this evolution was crucial in extending the 
protection of international criminal law, particularly to instances where 
political or military leaders attack their own people in a systematic manner 
or on a widespread scale, the historical provenance of crimes against 
humanity demonstrates that the international community saw them as 
inherently linked to the ravages of war. In fact, that connection is still 
regularly apparent, as shown during the recent horrific violence in Libya 
and Syria. By re-linking the notion of war to the prosecution of crimes 
against humanity, the question addressed in this paper could be 
misinterpreted as suggesting a return to the antiquated notion that the 
interests of the international community are coterminous with the 
existence of inter-State conflict, and that crimes committed outside that 
context are beyond the reach of international law. However, such a 
conclusion should be avoided, and instead the following analysis is 
premised on the basis that crimes against humanity can indeed occur 
irrespective of the existence of an armed conflict. The focus is instead on 
whether the existence of an illegal use of armed force may be prosecuted 
within the legal parameters of a crime against humanity and the conditions 
under which this could occur. As such, this approach is born out of legal 
necessity given the ICC’s current lack of jurisdiction over aggression, 
rather than due to a restrictive reading of crimes against humanity as a 
matter of substantive law. 
The manner in which this paper seeks to respond to the problem posed 
is twofold. First, it considers how the factual basis of an unlawful use of 
force could be prosecuted as one or more crimes against humanity and 
could in fact assist in meeting the relevant criteria. A number of areas are 
identified in which the inherent nature of armed aggression will, by 
definition, satisfy certain substantive elements of crimes against humanity. 
Second, this paper presents a legal strategy whereby instances of 
aggression could be adjudicated when prosecuting crimes against 
humanity through the co-perpetration mode of liability and, as a corollary 
of this strategy, be considered as a factor for sentencing purposes.  
 
 
 5. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶¶ 140–141. 
 6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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II. THE IMPACT OF ILLEGAL FORCE ON THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY 
As with any criminal prosecution, the analysis of responsibility for 
crimes against humanity by way of an illegal use of force must start from 
first principles and at all times adhere to the fundamental principle of 
legality, better known by its Latin name nullem crimen sine lege. 
In order for conduct to constitute an illegal use of force prosecutable as 
a crime against humanity, it must meet the definition of one or more 
crimes contained in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.7 This axiomatic 
requirement cannot be deviated from, no matter how manifestly illegal the 
use of force happens to be. 
Every crime in Article 7 includes the so-called chapeau8 elements of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and the 
demonstration of a State or organizational policy behind the attack.9 It is 
also necessary to prove the elements of the underlying crime(s) such as 
murder, extermination, or torture,10 and the corresponding mental 
elements.11 Additionally, the Court’s jurisdiction must be established 
either by way of referral by a State Party,12 an ad hoc referral by a State,13 
a referral by the United Nations Security Council,14 or the exercise of the 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers to launch an investigation and 
prosecution.15 
Whilst illegal uses of force must meet the same essential elements 
required for any other conduct in order to be considered a crime against 
humanity, its factual context would have profound effects on the 
prosecution of such a crime. 
First, the occurrence of an aggressive attack would assist in 
demonstrating the chapeau elements. An illegal use of force is not an 
accidental event. It would almost inevitably be orchestrated at high levels 
of the State or of an organization and carried out according to a defined 
plan, thereby fulfilling the element of a systematic attack and also 
 
 
 7. Id. art. 22(1). 
 8. The chapeau elements are the general requirements under the Rome Statute that apply to all 
crimes against humanity and must be established in addition to the specific elements of the underlying 
crimes. 
 9. Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 7(1), 7(2)(a). 
 10. Id. art. 7(1)(a)–(k). 
 11. Id. art. 30. 
 12. Id. art. 14. 
 13. Id. art. 12(3). 
 14. Id. art. 13(b). 
 15. Id. art 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/12
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demonstrating a policy behind the attack, both of which are necessary 
elements required to establish a crime against humanity.16 Moreover, if the 
illegal use of force were of a sufficient scale to meet the definition of 
aggression adopted at Kampala,17 then it would also likely be widespread 
and thus again satisfy the chapeau element. 
However, simply demonstrating that a widespread or systematic attack 
has been carried out according to a policy or plan is not sufficient to meet 
the chapeau requirements of a crime against humanity. The fundamental 
and defining characteristic of a crime against humanity is that the conduct 
must occur as part of an attack on a civilian population. In most situations 
that have come before international courts thus far involving some form of 
illegal use of force by States or State-like entities, the military action has 
been accompanied by targeted—but parallel—attacks against civilians. For 
example, the attack by the Bosnian Serb forces on the Srebrenica and Žepa 
enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995, which arguably could 
constitute an illegal use of force, was accompanied by the mass killing and 
mistreatment of Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children by the 
Bosnian Serb forces under Ratko Mladić’s command.18 Similarly, Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 saw numerous attacks by Iraqi troops against 
Kuwaiti civilians.19 
On the other hand, military operations, including those that involve the 
killing of civilians on a large scale, will not automatically fulfill the 
chapeau elements required for crimes against humanity. Military 
operations of any significant scale almost invariably entail civilian 
casualties, but such operations do not become crimes against humanity 
merely by virtue of that fact alone. In order to meet the requirements for 
prosecution as a crime against humanity in such circumstances, it must be 
shown that alongside the military operation an attack against a civilian 
population was also being conducted.20 Only to the extent that civilian 
deaths form part of the attack on the civilian population, rather than being 
purely collateral damage of an attack aimed only at legitimate military 
targets, may the perpetrators be prosecuted for crimes against humanity.  
 
 
 16. Id. arts. 7(1), 7(2)(a). 
 17. I.C.C. Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1) (June 11, 2011). 
 18. Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement. 
pdf.  
 19. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Iraq / Kuwait: Arbitrary Arrest / Fear of Torture: Haidar 
Ashkanani, Muhammad Kadhim, ‘Ali Kadhim, ‘Abd Al-Muhsin Kadhim, Jawad Al-Qallaf, Muhammad 
Ibrahim, Doc. No. UA 344/90 (Aug. 29, 1990) (referring to the fear of torture committed by Iraqi 
forces against hundreds of people arrested since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). 
 20. See, e.g., Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, ¶¶ 755, 775. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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It is in this respect that the paradigm of an illegal use of force is 
potentially of significance. Its unlawful context could be used to refute the 
argument that the deaths can be classified as collateral damage resulting 
from a lawful military operation. Where civilian deaths flow from an 
unlawful use of force, it can be argued that they do not fall within the 
penumbra of permissible collateral damage. Indeed, certain prosecutors at 
Nuremberg took this notion even further and argued that all killing carried 
out by the perpetrators of aggressive wars is automatically illegal and that 
the architects of such aggression should be held liable for each killing as 
an act of murder.21 Whilst that argument goes well beyond conventional 
understandings of humanitarian law and blurs the line between jus in bello 
and jus ad bellum, its rationale—that an illegally founded action should 
not provide a cloak of legitimacy for the act of killing—nonetheless holds 
certain persuasive force.22 It suggests that the unlawful nature of an attack 
could have a profound effect on whether it is conceptualized as an attack 
on a civilian population and thus open the door to prosecution for crimes 
against humanity. 
 
 
 21. See Walter G. Sharp, Sr., Revoking an Aggressor’s License to Kill Military Forces Serving 
the United Nations: Making Deterrence Personal, 22 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 1 (1998) (referring 
to Shawcross’ submission that “[t]he killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in international 
and in national law, only where the war is legal. But where the war is illegal . . . there is nothing to 
justify the killing, and these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber 
band”). 
 22. For arguments supportive of this view, see generally DAVID RODIN & HENRY SHUE (eds.), 
JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS (Oxford University 
Press 2008). Of course, the converse cannot be true: the lawful nature of a conflict does not mean that 
all killings in that conflict are legal. Additionally, as Military Tribunal III in Altstötter et al. pointed 
out: 
If we should adopt the view that by reason of the fact that the war was a criminal war of 
aggression every act which would have been legal in a defensive war was illegal in this one, 
we would be forced to the conclusion that every soldier who marched under orders into 
occupied territory or who fought in the homeland was a criminal and a murderer. The rules of 
land warfare upon which the prosecution has relied would not be the measure of conduct and 
the pronouncement of guilt in any case would become a mere formality. 
United States of America v. Altstötter et al., Case No. 3, Judgment, in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10—VOLUME 
III: “THE JUSTICE CASE” 1027 (Nuernberg Military Tribunals 1951). Given that the aggression 
definition agreed upon at Kampala contains a “leadership” element, the concerns expressed in this case 
have certainly abated. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has also pointed out that “the application of 
[jus in bello] rules [are] not affected by the legitimacy of the use of force by a party to the armed 
conflict.” Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovksi, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 44 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tar 
culovski/acjug/en/100519_ajudg.pdf. Similarly, “whether an attack was ordered as pre-emptive, 
defensive or offensive is from a legal point of view irrelevant. . . . The issue . . . is whether the way the 
military action was carried out was criminal or not.” Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 812 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/acjug/en/cer-aj041217e.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/12
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A second issue raised in the paradigm of an unlawful use of force is 
that of the required mental elements for crimes against humanity. Where 
an illegal attack entails the large-scale killing of civilians, it is likely that 
the operation will constitute an attack on a civilian population. 
Accordingly, the objective elements of a crime against humanity such as 
murder or even extermination would be established a priori. However, to 
prosecute such conduct as a crime against humanity, the corresponding 
mental elements would have to be fulfilled. For murder, this would require 
showing that the perpetrator(s) (a) committed murder with intent and 
knowledge; and (b) knew or intended that the murder be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.23 
For mental element (a), intent and knowledge of an illegal killing is 
required for criminal liability.24 If there were evidence that the proponents 
of the unlawful use of force directly intended murders of civilians to be 
committed as part of the unlawful attack, then this mental element would 
be satisfied. However, in the more likely circumstances where the 
evidence demonstrated that the perpetrator(s) knew that murders of 
civilians would occur as a consequence of the unlawful attack but did not 
necessarily desire this outcome, the analysis would be more complex. The 
key question would be whether the murders would have occurred in the 
ordinary course of events as a consequence of an unlawful attack. 
Analyzing this vague notion of “ordinary course of events”25 will no doubt 
be the subject of intense litigation before the ICC for many years to come 
and will require a case-by-case assessment. Nonetheless, in the context of 
an illegal use of armed force, the murder of civilians will usually occur in 
the ordinary course of events. Examples of notorious uses of force 
throughout history support this proposition: the German aggressive 
campaign in World War II was accompanied by the large-scale killing of 
civilians, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also saw large-scale 
killings.26 Conversely, it is hard, if not impossible, to find examples of 
unlawful uses of force that have not been accompanied by the murder of 
civilians. Accordingly, under the Rome Statute, the mental elements for 
 
 
 23. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 30; I.C.C. Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3, ICC Elements of Crimes, 
General Introduction, para. 2. 
 24. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 30 
 25. Id. arts. 30(2)(d), 30(3). 
 26. David J. Scheffer, U.S. War Crimes Ambassador Reviews Saddam Hussein’s Criminality: 
The Case for Justice in Iraq, MIDDLE EAST INST. & THE IRAQ FOUNDATION, NAT’L PRESS CLUB, 
WASH. D.C. (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/2000/09/iraq-000918.htm 
(“During the occupation [of Kuwait], Saddam Hussein’s forces killed more than a thousand Kuwaiti 
nationals, as well as many others from other nations”). 
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the underlying crime of murder would likely be established in the 
circumstances of an illegal attack where the large-scale killing of civilians 
is the natural and foreseeable outcome in the ordinary course of events. 
In relation to mental element (b), namely the knowledge that the 
murders were part of an attack on a civilian population, this would likely 
be established if the perpetrator(s) were part of the forces leading or 
carrying out the unlawful attack. Such a perpetrator would likely be aware 
of the context and unlawful nature (in a factual sense) of the operation in 
which their conduct occurred as well as the occurrence of other murders 
and crimes against civilians, particularly in the case of any perpetrator 
occupying a leadership role. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates not only that conduct amounting 
to an illegal use of force may be prosecuted as a crime against humanity, 
but also that such conduct will by its very nature often establish the critical 
chapeau and mental elements required for a conviction under Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute.  
III. CO-PERPETRATION IN A COMMON PLAN OF AGGRESSION WHERE 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY OCCUR IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF 
EVENTS 
Having analyzed the elements of crimes against humanity within the 
factual matrix of an illegal use of force, the question arises as to how such 
a prosecution would be conducted. One strategy under the current 
provisions of the Rome Statute would be to charge the perpetrators with 
crimes against humanity committed in connection with a joint criminal 
plan amounting to aggression. 
A single person acting alone would not generally have the capacity to 
carry out international crimes of the kind that attract the attention of the 
ICC. The Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) has put into place an explicit 
policy decision to focus its investigative and prosecutorial attention “on 
those who bear the greatest responsibility” for international crimes “such 
as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly responsible for those 
crimes.”27 This means that, more often than not, ICC cases will concern 
 
 
 27. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the 
Prosecutor, at 7 (Sept. 2003), available at http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B 
25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf; see also ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report 
on Prosecutorial Strategy, at 5 (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D673D 
D8C-D427-4547-BC69-2D363E07274B/143708/ProsecutorialStrategy20060914_English.pdf (“Based on 
the statute, the Office adopted a policy of focusing its efforts on the most serious crimes and on those 
who bear the greatest responsibility for those crimes.”); ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/12
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the actions of a small plurality of persons either acting jointly (direct co-
perpetration) or jointly through other persons (indirect co-perpetration).28 
In the context of aggression where crimes against humanity have 
potentially been committed, this is all the more likely due to their requisite 
elements: the former requires a leadership element29 and the latter a state 
or organizational policy,30 both of which are conducive to interaction 
amongst a number of persons. As such, illegal uses of force resulting in 
the commission of crimes against humanity will most likely result in 
charges containing co-perpetration (direct or indirect) as the mode of 
liability at the ICC. 
Utilizing co-perpetration in the context of an illegal use of force is 
significant because this mode of liability requires the existence of an 
agreement or common plan.31 Importantly, according to current ICC 
jurisprudence, the common plan need not be directed at committing the 
crime in question (in this case crimes against humanity), nor need it be 
intrinsically criminal in nature, but it must contain “a critical element of 
criminality, namely that, its implementation embodied a sufficient risk 
that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be committed.”32 In 
 
 
Strategy 2009–2012, at 5–6 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-36 
50-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf (“In accordance with 
this statutory scheme, the Office consolidated a policy of focused investigations and prosecutions, 
meaning it will investigate and prosecute those who bear the great responsibility for the most serious 
crimes.”). 
 28. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25(3)(a). 
 29. I.C.C. Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1) (June 11, 2011). 
 30. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(a). 
 31. For examples of the ICC addressing direct co-perpetration, see Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 343 (Jan. 29, 2007), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf; Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-
424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 350 (June 15, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ 
doc/doc699541.pdf; Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-121, Corrigendum of 
the “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,” ¶ 128 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
1036947.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 981 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
For examples of the ICC addressing indirect co-perpetration, see Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 492, 522 (Sept. 30, 
2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Case No. ICC-
01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute, ¶ 301 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf; Prosecutor v. 
Muthaura et al., Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-382, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 297 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1314543.pdf. It should be added that responsibility pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute 
also explicitly requires the existence of a plurality of persons acting pursuant to a common 
purpose/plan. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25(3)(d). 
 32. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ¶ 984; see also Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation 
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other words, the nature of the common plan is to a certain degree 
irrelevant; it need not fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction so long as the 
underlying crime (crime against humanity) does and there is a sufficient 
risk of its commission.33 Although the idea that a common plan can have 
at its core a non-criminal purpose (at least not a crime known to 
international criminal law) has been subject to harsh criticism (albeit in the 
context of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”)),34 the same cannot be said 
where the purpose of the common plan is to commit aggression, a crime 
that is clearly recognized at international law, was envisaged in the Rome 
Statute,35 and has now been defined by the Kampala amendments.36 
If the OTP were to charge the accused with crimes against humanity as 
a co-perpetrator on the basis that there was a common plan to commit the 
crime of aggression, and a sufficient risk existed that a crime against 
humanity would be committed in the ordinary course of events, the OTP 
could require the Trial Chamber to adjudicate on the issue of aggression. 
In other words, the Trial Chamber would be asked to make a factual 
determination for the purpose of proving a legal element of the mode of 
liability only—beyond a reasonable doubt—which would in turn only 
 
 
of Charges, ¶ 344; Banda and Jerbo, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-121, Corrigendum of the “Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges,” ¶ 129; Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10-465, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 271 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1286409.pdf. For a closer analysis of the nature of the common plan as formulated by the Lubanga 
Trial Judgment, see Manuel J. Ventura, Two Controversies in the Lubanga Trial Judgment of the ICC: 
The Nature of Co-perpetration’s Common Plan and the Classification of the Armed Conflict, in 
STUART CASEY-MASLEN (ed.), WAR REPORT: 2012 (Oxford University Press 2013) (forthcoming), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2283443. 
 33. In this respect, co-perpetration as currently formulated at the ICC is potentially a broader 
basis for criminal liability than the mode of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) that is utilized at the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Whereas JCE requires 
the participants in the common criminal plan to share the intent to commit one or more crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the court, seeProsecutor v. Brñanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 431 
(Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acjug/en/brd-aj070403-e.pdf; see also Prosecutor 
v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 172 (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
martic/acjug/en/mar-aj081008e.pdf (co-perpetration in its present form only requires the risk that the 
common plan result in the crimes charged). This issue is now squarely before the ICC Appeals 
Chamber, having been raised by Lubanga’s defense team in their appeal of the trial judgment. 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2948, Mémoire de la Défense de M. Thomas 
Lubanga relatif à l’appel à l’encontre du «Jugement rendu en application de l’Article 74 du Statut» 
rendu le 14 mars 2012, ¶¶ 327–31 (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529983.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., Wayne Jordash & Penelope van Tuyl, Failure to Carry the Burden of Proof: How 
Joint Criminal Enterprise Lost its Way at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 8(2) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
591, 592–93 (2010); Jennifer Easterday, Obscuring Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: The 
Conviction of Augustine Gbao by the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
PUBLICIST 36 (2009). 
 35. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1)(d). 
 36. See I.C.C. Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1) (June 11, 2011); supra text accompanying 
note 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/12
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE FOG OF WAR 533 
 
 
 
 
incur the individual criminal responsibility of the accused for crimes 
against humanity and avoid any finding of guilt for the crime of 
aggression per se.37 
The approach outlined above for the judicial adjudication of aggression 
would not be entirely unprecedented before international criminal 
tribunals. For example, in the case against Charles Taylor at the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), the common plan (pursuant to JCE as 
the mode of liability) was described as being one to “wag[e] war in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Gambia”38 and to “gain and maintain 
political power and physical control over the territories of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, terrorizing the civilian population in the process.”39 This 
could also have been expressed as the accused being part of a common 
plan to commit the crime of aggression upon the territory of Sierra Leone 
through the use of “armed bands, groups, [or] irregulars” on Liberia’s 
behalf,40 which involved, in the ordinary course of events, the terrorization 
of the civilian population (together with the other underlying crimes).  
Through this innovative legal strategy, a judgment of guilt for crimes 
against humanity could be attained that would inherently recognize and 
implicitly condemn the illegal use of force giving rise to the underlying 
violence and crimes. 
IV. THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AS A FACTOR IN SENTENCING 
Further, a positive factual finding that a common plan of aggression 
existed would have a tangible effect when the time arrives for 
deliberations on imposing the appropriate sentence. 
At the ICC, Chambers are required, for sentencing purposes, to “take 
into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person.”41 Judges are also empowered to 
consider, inter alia, “the nature of the unlawful behaviour and the means 
 
 
 37. It is important to note that the Pre-Trial Chamber would also make this same determination, 
albeit to lower evidentiary standards: ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ for the arrest warrant or 
summons to appear stage and ‘substantial grounds to believe’ for the confirmation of charges stage. 
Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 58(1)(a) or 58(7), 61(7). 
 38. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 23 (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=k%2b03KREEPCQ%3d&tabid=107. 
 39. Id. ¶ 2220. 
 40. The use of such groups by one state on the territory of another could prima facie constitute an 
‘act of aggression’ for the purposes of the crime of aggression. I.C.C. Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8 
bis (2)(g) (June 11, 2011). 
 41. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 78(1). 
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employed to execute the crime.”42 In addition, a non-exhaustive list of 
aggravating circumstances are outlined including, inter alia, “[a]buse of 
power or official capacity”43 and other non-enumerated circumstances 
which “by virtue of their nature are similar to those mentioned.”44 
These sentencing considerations are wide enough to permit judges to 
consider a factual determination that a common plan to carry out the crime 
of aggression was executed by the accused, as a result of which crimes 
against humanity were perpetrated in the ordinary course of events. This 
could either be considered as part of the gravity of the crime or, 
alternatively, as an aggravating factor.45 With respect to the latter, as was 
held in Lubanga, “[s]ince any aggravating factors established by the 
Chamber may have a significant effect on the overall length of the 
sentence . . . it is necessary that they are established to the criminal 
standard of proof, name ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”46 Therefore, a 
positive factual determination (to the same evidentiary standard) that a 
common plan was formed and executed to commit the crime of aggression 
would dovetail nicely for sentencing purposes and could ultimately lead to 
a longer sentence than would otherwise have been imposed on the 
convicted perpetrator. 
At the same time, permitting the crime of aggression to be considered 
at sentencing can be objected to on the basis that the accused was never 
charged, let alone convicted, of such a crime. However, this same issue 
has already played out in the Lubanga case, albeit with respect to different 
crimes. There, the prosecution submitted that sexual violence perpetrated 
upon female child soldiers should be considered at sentencing, 
notwithstanding the fact that they had (a) not charged the accused with this 
crime; and (b) had actively opposed victims’ counsel unsuccessful 
attempts to ‘add’ such crimes via the recharacterization procedure 
pursuant to Regulation 55.47 The Trial Chamber stated that the 
 
 
 42. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, I.C.C. Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 145(1)(c). 
 43. Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(ii). 
 44. Id. Rule 145(2)(b)(vi). 
 45. “[F]actors that are relevant for determining the gravity of the crime cannot additionally be 
taken into account as aggravating circumstances.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 78 (July 10, 2012), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf; see also id. ¶ 35. 
 46. Id. ¶ 33. 
 47. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, Judgment on the Appeals 
of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 
entitled “Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the 
Facts may be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court” 
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc790147.pdf. 
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prosecution’s failure to charge Lubanga with sexual violence did not 
determine the question of whether it could be considered as a relevant 
factor.48 Instead, it held that it was indeed “entitled to consider sexual 
violence . . . [as part of] the nature of the unlawful behavior; the . . . 
manner in which the crime was committed; . . . [and] as showing the crime 
was committed with particular cruelty.”49 The fact that sexual violence had 
not formed part of the decision on the confirmation of charges did not alter 
this position.50 Ultimately, sexual violence was not considered in 
Lubanga’s sentencing, not because the Court was unable to do so, but 
because “the link between Mr Lubanga and sexual violence, in the context 
of the charges, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.”51 
The same reasoning that was applied in Lubanga must also apply to the 
crime of aggression if presented in the manner outlined in this paper: the 
fact that the accused was not charged nor convicted for this offence is 
irrelevant. 
As has been outlined, it is in the sentencing that the hard work of 
prosecutors with respect to proving the common plan of aggression would 
bear fruit. Such a strategy is therefore not a trip through uncharted legal 
waters merely for the sake of it or a means to satisfy lingering academic 
curiosities, but a justifiable exercise with practical implications. It would 
also be the best manner by which to fairly capture and expose the true 
extent of the criminality encompassed in the crimes against humanity. 
Furthermore, there is already precedent from the SCSL’s Taylor case 
for considering an act of aggression—the use of force—as an aggravating 
circumstance. In its sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber considered 
 
 
 48. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, ¶ 67. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶¶ 29, 68. This particular holding has been objected to by Lubanga’s defence team in their 
appeal of the trial judgment. However, because it did not ultimately affect the sentence, his lawyers 
indicated that «[l]a Dèfense n’entend donc pas soulever formellement ce moyen d’appel dans le cadre 
du présent mémoire.» They nevertheless reserved the right to raise it, as appropriate, on account of the 
submissions of the Prosecutor on appeal. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
2949, Mémoire de la Défense de M. Thomas Lubanga relatif à l’appel à l’encontre de la «Decision 
relative à la peine, rendue en application de l’article 76 du Statut» rendue par al Chambre de première 
instance I le 10 juillet 2012, ¶¶ 107–108 (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc151932 
5.pdf. 
 51. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, ¶ 75. The authors note that 
the OTP has appealed this finding on the basis that the Chamber applied too stringent a test in order to 
establish aggravating factors, and that in any event, it reached unreasonable findings of fact. 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2950, Prosecution’s Document in Support of 
Appeal Against the “Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute” (ICC-01/04-01/06-
2901), ¶¶ 67–93 (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1519360.pdf. 
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the “extra-territoriality” of the crimes at issue in the case and in doing so, 
invoked the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)’s holding in Nicaragua: 
The International Court of Justice has held that acts of intervention 
by a State in support of an opposition within another State constitute 
“a breach of the customary principle of non-intervention [and] will 
also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute 
a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international 
relations. . . .” While these provisions of customary law govern 
conduct between States, the Trial Chamber considers that the 
violation of this principle by a Head of State individually engaging 
in criminal conduct can be taken into account as an aggravating 
factor.52 
Considering that Taylor was in fact found guilty of aiding and abetting the 
crimes of two rebel forces (the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) and 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”)) in Sierra Leone by 
providing them with arms and ammunition, military personnel, operational 
support and moral support,53 it could be concluded that the facts at issue 
also constituted the indirect and illegal use of force by Liberia (through 
Taylor’s actions) upon Sierra Leone in the manner described by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua. The key issue would have been whether the control exercised 
by Liberia over the RUF and the AFRC was of a sufficient level so as to 
attribute their acts back to Liberia.54 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Trial 
Chamber considered Liberia’s cross-border aiding of the rebels as a factor 
in its sentencing deliberations. 
It is important to recall here that such indirect use of force—an act of 
aggression—carried out by a Head of State such as Charles Taylor (easily 
satisfying aggression’s “leadership” element) must amount to a “manifest 
violation” of the UN Charter (by reference to its character, gravity, and 
scale) to be transformed into the crime of aggression.55 In the absence of a 
 
 
 52. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 27 (May 30, 2012) 
(citations omitted), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=U6xCITNg4tY%3d&tabid=107. 
 53. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgement, ¶¶ 6910–6915, 6918–6924, 
6927–6937, 6940–6946 (May 18, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=k%2b03KRE 
EPCQ%3d&tabid=107. 
 54. Utilizing the ICJ’s Nicaragua test of “effective control,” it is unlikely that the acts of the 
rebels could be directly attributed to Liberia. However, it is possible that the facts could meet the 
ICTY’s less stringent test of “overall control” as set out in the Tadić Appeal Judgement. See Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J, 14, ¶ 116 (June 27); 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 19, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
 55. I.C.C. Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8 bis (1)–(2) (June 11, 2011). 
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factual finding with respect to the latter and the issue of state attribution, 
the SCSL was only two substantive elements away56 from considering the 
crime of aggression as defined by the ICC as a sentencing factor as 
advocated by this paper, notwithstanding the fact it has no jurisdiction 
ratione materiae over such a crime (or the use of the force for the purposes 
of state responsibility) and was considered proprio motu, since the 
Prosecutor had not expressly raised the issue in her submissions.57 
V. CONCLUSION 
In its final judgment, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
described aggression as “differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”58 While there 
was undoubtedly a certain amount of rhetoric at play, it is all-too-apparent 
that illegal uses of armed force almost inevitably entail the large-scale 
commission of violent crimes and humanitarian abuses. However, 
aggression and crimes against humanity are not two sides of the same 
coin. Although a case for the former does not necessarily equal a case of 
the latter, there are areas where they overlap. Indeed, it is entirely possible 
for the ICC at some point in the future to cumulatively convict person(s) 
for both crimes relying upon the same factual matrix.59 
That aggression is an international crime, at least since Nuremberg, has 
never been in doubt.60 What was in doubt was if the crime would ever be 
defined. With the Kampala amendments, the question has now turned to 
 
 
 56. However, given the appalling and depraved nature, scale and spread of the acts perpetrated 
by the RUF and the AFRC during the conflict in Sierra Leone, particularly during the invasion of 
Freetown in January 1999, were they to be attributable to Liberia, it is almost certain that the “manifest 
violation” element would be established. 
 57. It should be pointed out that Taylor’s defense team have appealed the Trial Judgement’s 
sentencing on the grounds that it, inter alia, (1) impermissibly utilized principles of state responsibility 
and (2) impermissibly considered aggravating factors proprio motu. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-2003-01-A, Appellant’s Submissions of Charles Ghankay Taylor, ¶¶ 780–784, 744–751 (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=R5js%2fPiBejc%3d&tabid=107. It remains to 
be seen whether such considerations survive appellate review. 
 58. United States of America et al. v. Göring et al., Judgment, in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 186. 
 59. This is because crimes against humanity and aggression both contain elements that the other 
does not. According to the jurisprudence, in such circumstances cumulative charging or convictions 
would not offend the ne bis in idem principle. See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, 
Appeal Judgement, ¶ 412 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty. 
org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf. 
 60. Even before the Kampala amendments, the House of Lords (as it then was) had held that 
aggression was a crime known to international law. R v. Jones, [2006] UKHL 16, ¶ 19 (per Lord 
Bingham), ¶ 59 (per Lord Hoffmann). 
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when the ICC will ever consider the offense. The analysis herein suggests 
that in instances where crimes against humanity occur in the ordinary 
course of events of an aggressive war and the requisite elements for both 
crimes are present, ICC Prosecutors should not proceed on the assumption 
that they are entirely prohibited from touching upon aggression. To do so, 
without consideration of the option presented above, would only serve to 
downplay the true level of criminality inherent in the launching of an 
illegal use of force. 
Although the legal strategy suggested herein is an innovative and 
untested solution to the ICC’s lack of current jurisdiction over aggression, 
it is driven by a desire to reign in the destructive potential of the illegal use 
of armed force. High level perpetrators with military personnel and 
equipment capable of large-scale violence at their behest should be aware 
of the potential for criminal prosecution, and a long custodial sentence, if 
their actions result in mass killing. In this manner, a small step can be 
taken towards achieving the peaceful vision of those who sought justice at 
Nuremberg, in Rome, and at Kampala. 
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